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PROBATE JURISDICTION IN WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS

PROBATE JURISDICTION IN WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTIONS
V. J. TIDBALL*

When the District Court sits in probate matters pursuant to Atticle 5, Section 10, of the State Constitution, and statutes enacted pursuant thereto, it sits as a probate court with limited and special jurisdiction to pass only on matters of probate as provided in the Probate
Code.1
The Wyoming statute giving a right of action for wrongful death
is not a part of the Probate Code, but of the Civil Code. However, the
statute (3-404 W. C. S. 1945) does provide that the action for wrongful death shall be brought "by and in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person; and the amount received in any
such action shall be distributed to the parties and in the proportions
provided by law, in relation to the distribution of personal estates
left by persons dying intestate." It is undoubtedly this provision that
has caused many attorneys to believe that the probate court has jurisdiction to direct such actions, approve settlements of the claim, and
compel the personal representative to account to the probate court
for the proper distribution of the sum recovered in such actions.
It is the contention of the writer that the only jurisdiction the
District Court, sitting as a Probate Court, has in such actions is to
appoint an administrator or executor, fix his bond and discharge him
when he reports to the Probate Court that he has performed his duties
regarding such action and distributed the proceeds to those entitled
thereto; and that the Probate Court has no jurisdiction to order or
allow the action, approve a settlement if such be made, fix the fees to
be retained by such personal representative or his attorney, nor to approve or disapprove his distribution of the sum collected. It is further
maintained that where the deceased leaves an estate, (and any sum
collected in a wrongful death action is no part of his estate) the personal representative appointed by the Probate Court acts in a dual
capacity. He acts as executor or administrator of the estate under
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court and he acts as a trustee in the
wrongful death action for the heirs at law of deceased entirely outside
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court but under the jurisdiction of the
court in which the action is begun, and if such personal representative
fails in his trust to properly collect damages or to properly distribute
what he collects, he and his bondsmen are liable to those who have been
damaged by his default, and no approval of his acts by the probate
court that he may induce that court to make, will protect him. In other
*--Judge of the District Court, Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming.
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Church v. Quinier, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 Pac. 1073 (1924).
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words the statute imposes upon the administrator or executor the
added burden of a trustee for the heirs of decedent in the recovery of
damages for decendent's wrongful death and in the distribution of any
sum recovered according to the mandate of the state. In an action to
recover for wrongful death, while the personal representative appointed by the Probate Court sues as plaintiff, he does not sue in his capacity as administrator or executor, but as a trustee for the heirs at law
of decedent. It follows that the defendant in such action cannot
recover a judgment on a claim against decedent's estate by way of
counterclaim against the plaintiff, because the latter is not representing the estate of deceased in such action but is representing the distributees of the proceeds of such action.
How then is the personal representative, acting as trustee for the
beneficiaries, to determine who such beneficiaries are? If there is an
intestate estate left by the decedent, and in the course of its administration, the Probate Court makes a valid determination of decedent's
heirs, presumably the trustee in the wrongful death action could rely
on such determination in distributing the money recovered in the
wrongful death action. But, if the decedent left no estate (and the
sum recovered in a wrongful death action is no part of his estate) the
trustee must resort to other means to determine who the beneficiaries
are. It has been suggested in some cases that he should bring an action
in equity to determine the matter and also that the Court in which the
action for wrongful death is brought might determine the beneficiaries; but, of course, to do so the persons claiming to be such beneficiaries would have to be brought in so as to have their day in court.
Just how that might be done is not clear to the writer.
In some states, for example, Kansas, Ohio, New York and Illinois,
the statutes provide that the Probate Court, or the Court appointing
the personal representative, shall make the distribution. Some of such
statutes provide that the Court shall apportion the sum recovered
among certain named beneficiaries according to their respective loss;
and in some other states it is provided that the jury sitting in the
wrongful death action shall determine the amount each claimed beneficiary is to receive. Our statute is silent as to how the personal representative is to determine who the beneficiaries are, but requires that
any sum rocevered, which may include loss of anticipated support, loss
of comfort, care, advice and society of decedent, and funeral expenses,
shall be distributed, not in proportion to the loss or expense incurred,
but in the proportion provided by Section 6-2501 W. C. S. 1945; the
statute of descent.
The case of Minkin vs. Minkin2 is an interesting case from Pennsylvania where the jury by its verdict determines the amount of recovery and to whom and in what proportion the money goes. The
2. 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. (2d) 461 (1939).
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Pennsylvania statute provides that the action in case of the husband's
death, shall be brought by the widow, and if no widow, by the personal
representative, and that the beneficiaries shall be the husband, widow,
children, or parents of deceased, and no other relatives, and that the
amount recovered shall go to the above in the proportion they would
take decedent's personal estate in case of intestacy and without liability to creditors. In this case it was alleged that the husband had been
killed by the negligence of the wife (widow) in driving an automobile. The action was brought by the two minor children, by their
next friend, against their mother. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the action was improperly brought by the children through
a next friend, but since the children were the real parties in interest
and the action under the statute should have been brought by the
widow as trustee for the children (she could not recover on her own
behalf because her negligence caused the death) the complaint would
be amended in the Supreme Court to make the widow as trustee plaintiff suing herself as tort feasor for the benefit of the children. During
the trial and appeal one of the children had died, and in view of this
the Court said that in the new trial ordered the jury should be instructed that if they found for the plaintiff, they should find the value
of decedent's life to the widow and surviving child, and having done
that (since the widow could recover nothing, and one child was dead)
should award the plaintiff, for the surviving child, one-third of that
amount, being the proportion of decedent's personal estate passing to
the minor in case of intestacy.
We believe the following authorities support the propositions
heretofore set forth herein: That the Probate Court, in the absence of
a statute giving it such authority, has no jurisdiction over any sum
recovered as damages for wrongful death, and no jurisdiction over the
personal representative who recovers the damages, and that in such
action the personal representative acts as trustee and not as an administrator or executor. See 17 C.J. 1227; 25 C.J.C. 1127; Mayer v.
Mayer;3 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Young;4 Re Estate of Egisto
Riecomi, Deceased;5 Pearson v. N. M. and S. Corp.;6 Bibson v. Solomon;7 Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester.8 In the Coliseum Motor Company
case the Wyoming Supreme Court said: "The administrators acts but
in the capacity of a trustee".9
In the Riccomi case the Court said: "The money recovered constitutes no part of the estate of deceased, and where the action is brought
or the money recovered by the personal representative of the deceased,
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

106 Minn. 484, 119 N.W. 217 (1909).
107 Okla. 151, 231 Pac. 261 (1924).
185 Cal. 458, 197 Pacc. 97, 14 A. L. R. 509 (1921).
219 N. C. 717, 14 S.E. (2d) 811 (1941).
136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E. (2d) 996, 125 A. L. R. 903 (1939).
43 Wyo. 298, 3 Pa. (2d) 105 (1931).
Id. at 311, 3 P. (2d) at 108.
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such personal representative is acting solely as a statutory trustee for
the benefit of the heirs on account of whom the recovery is had.
"On word more with relation to the procedure adopted in this
matter. The matter was apparently treated as a proceeding in probate, and is entitled, 'In the matter of the Estate of Egisto Riccomi,
Deceased.' As we have seen, this money constituted no part of the
estate of the said deceased, and the proceeding is not one within the
probate jurisdiction of the Superior Court .... It was one as to the
subject matter of which the Superior Court had full jurisdiction ..."
In the Pearson (North Carolina) case cited above the statute appears to be similar to our except that the amount recovered is liable
to pay burial expenses of decedent, but no other debts; and it is distributed as is the personal estate of one dying intestate. In this particular case the father and mother of decedent were the beneficiaries;
and the action was brought by the administrator of decedent's estate,
the decedent being a child who was killed by an automobile belonging
to defendant. A question arose in the case as to whether the alleged
contributory negligence of the mother, if proved, would bar recovery.
The court held, in setting aside a non-suit entered by the trial court,
that contributory negligence of the mother would bar a recovery on
her behalf by the administrator but not as to the father's share of the
recovery; the Court arriving at its conclusion by holding that the administrator represented the parents of deceased and not decedent's
estate, and hence contributory negligence of a beneficiary would bar a
recovery of any amount that would inure to the beneficiary guilty of
contributory negligence.
In the Ohio case of Gibson v. Solomon (Supra.) it was held in an
action for wrongful death under a statute requiring such action to be
brought by the personal representative of deceased, that the personal
representative is but a nominal party and the designated beneficiaries
for whose benefit the action is maintained are the real parties in
interest.
In the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Young (Supra.)
the syllabus by the Court says: "Moneys recovered by the administrator of the estate of a deceased under the provisions of Section 824
(wrongful death statute) do not belong to the estate of the deceased,
and the County Court (the Probate Court) has no jurisdiction over the
administrator in the maintenance of such suit, or the settlement of such
claims or the distribution of such moneys. Damages recovered under
said section belong to the next of kin as therein provided and are in
compensation for the losses sustained by such kin on account of the
death of deceased.
"When the administrator of the estate of a deceased person receives into his hands moneys collected under the provisions of (the
wrongful death statute) and the next of kin and their respective parts
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are not disclosed in the judgment itself, he may resort to suit in a court
of equity to determine the cestui que trusts and the portion which each
is entitled to receive.
In the body of the opinion in that case it is said: "What court has
jurisdiction over the administration of this fund? The State Constitution... creates the County Court and gives it probate jurisdiction over
We have no statute further extendthe estates of deceased persons ....
ing this jurisdiction. This fund did not arise out of a claim owned by
the deceased in his lifetime and does not belong to the estate of the
deceased, but belong to certain cestui que trusts.... In the State Constitution there is created the District Court. It is made a Court of record
and is given general original jurisdiction as a court of law and of equity
over all cases where exclusive original jurisdiction is not given to another court. It, therefore, has exclusive original jurisdiction over this
official (the administrator bringing the action for wrongful death) in
the administration and distribution of this estate created by (the
wrongful death statute) .... It is the duty of the trustee at his peril to
distribute the trust estate to the proper cestui que trusts. To determine
to whom and in what proportion it shall be distributed, the trustee may
resort to suit in the District Court; and in following the final determination of that court as to its distribution, the trustee is amply protected."
In conclusion it is suggested that our wrongful death statute
should be amended so as to provide that only those close relatives of
deceased who actually suffer a loss may be beneficiaries in such an action, and the manner in which the amount recovered shall be distributed so as to reimburse those who have been put to expense on account of
doctor, hospital and funeral bills, and to reimburse the named beneficiaries. in proportion to their loss. The statute should also provide a
means by which the personal representative may determine, in a manner that will protect him, under order of court, just how distribution
of the money recovered is to be made, and in the payment of his fees
and expenses.

